

Australian Government's Stance on Nuclear Weaponry

Talking Points

Australia's position on nuclear weapons is clear – we are committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

The Government has consistently said that it wants to see deep and irreversible reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons held by all nuclear-armed states.

However, we recognise that this is a long-term process and that in a world where nuclear disarmament has not yet been achieved, Australia's security benefits from extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance.

***If asked:* about Australia's record on nuclear weapons**

Australia has a long-standing record on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and for universalising the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Australia supported the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed between the US and Russia in April 2010, and will continue to support a reduced role for nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of nuclear armed states, including the US.

Background

On 24 February 2012, the Japanese news agency Kyodo News emailed Defence seeking a response to an alleged discrepancy between Australia's public support for global nuclear disarmament, including through establishing the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament ('the Evans Commission'), and Australia's interest in credible US extended nuclear deterrence as stated in classified Defence documents.

Kyodo News quoted from an article published in *The Age* on 14 November 2011, which quoted from two Defence documents obtained through FOI that concern Australia's submission to the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review. The key quotes were that:

Australia has an abiding interest in a safe, secure and reliable United States nuclear stockpile

[Australia's] desire to support [the Evans commission's] goals must be balanced against our strategic interest in ensuring stability through ensuring a credible US extended deterrence.

A response to the enquiry by Kyodo News was submitted to Media Operations on 29 February 2012.

The response emphasised that there is no inconsistency in Australia's stance on nuclear weapons, based on the following points:

- Australia has consistently acknowledged the value afforded to our national security by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance, notably in the 2009 Defence White

Paper. As the effectiveness of extended deterrence and the reliability of the US nuclear stockpile are intertwined, Australia has an interest in a safe, secure and reliable US nuclear stockpile.

- Australia is committed to the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. However, the Government acknowledges that nuclear disarmament is a long-term process and accepts that, until it is achieved, nuclear weapons are part of the strategic environment. In this context, the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence contributes to international security and stability.
- The Government has consistently said that it wants to see deep and irreversible reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons held by all nuclear-armed states. However, it also recognises that actions must be taken to create the conditions under which such reductions can occur. Australia has a long-standing record as a proponent of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
- The Government's submission to the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) strongly supported US negotiations with Russia on a successor agreement to the 1994 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Australia welcomed the signing of New START between the US and Russia in April 2010.
- Australia gives priority to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and in the interim, maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Australia also supports the goal of universalising the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as efforts to bring non-NPT states within existing and future non-proliferation and disarmament mechanisms.
- Australia supports a reduced role for nuclear weapons in national security strategies. The Government welcomed the assurance provided in the 2010 NPR that the US will not use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to and in compliance with the NPT. Australia supports the objective stated in the 2010 NPR of making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons.
- Together with Japan, Australia established the independent International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament in 2008. Following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Australia established, again with Japan, the ten-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, dedicated to taking forward the outcomes of the NPT Review Conference.

Point of Contact

Michael Shoebridge, First Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy, (w) 6265 1883
Information valid as at: 1200, 29 February 2012

United States Force Posture Review – Progress

Talking Points

You may recall that when we held AUSMIN, which is the meeting between Australian Foreign and Defence Ministers and the United States Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Defense when we met in Melbourne in November 2010, we agreed that we would work closely with the United States on its Global Force Posture Review.

And in September last year, in San Francisco, we noted the progress that we had made and when the President visited Australia in November last year, the Prime Minister and the President announced a range of initiatives.

Firstly, that a United States Marine task force group would rotate out of Australian Army facilities in the Northern Territory, starting with 200 and growing over a period of time over five or six years to 2,500.

Secondly, we agreed that we would see a greater utilisation by United States Air Force of Australian Air Force bases in the Northern Territory, in northern Australia, particularly RAAF Darwin and RAAF Tindal.

And thirdly, we agreed that as our third priority, we would look in the future to greater access by United States Navy of our Indian Ocean port, HMAS *Stirling*, in my own state of Western Australia.

And they are the three priorities that we have been focusing on.

Since the President's visit, we have focused on bedding down the arrangements, so far as the first group of Marines is concerned.

If asked: about the impact of the budget on these initiatives

So far as the budget was concerned there will be no adverse impacts.

I indicated to US Secretary for Defense Leon Panetta that there will be no adverse impact for the work that we're doing with the United States on their Global Force Posture Review, namely the marines in Darwin, greater, in due course, air traffic access, so far as our northern airfields are concerned and, third and ultimately, greater navy traffic through HMAS *Stirling*.

If asked: Will this enhanced defence cooperation involve United States military bases in Australia?

No. There are no United States bases in Australia.

The agreed joint force posture initiatives are better viewed as an extension of our existing defence cooperation and defence arrangements.

If asked: How are these initiatives in Australia's interests?

Our work together on Force Posture continues a long tradition of our militaries working together, whether on the battlefields of the Western Front, Guadalcanal or in Afghanistan, or on the training range of Shoalwater Bay, or the Pacific Waters of Hawaii.

Australian and United States troops have long trained and exercised together and it is something that is of benefit to us both.

On any given day, there are up to 200 United States defence personnel posted to Australia with an average of a further 250 personnel visiting per month for discussions about strategy, or capability and materiel such as the Joint Strike Fighter or the latest developments in cyber security.

These initiatives will support our long-held strategic interests in maintaining and expanding United States engagement in our region.

They will also provide tangible benefits to Australia through enhanced Australian Defence Force training opportunities and improvements in interoperability with United States' forces.

These initiatives acknowledge that our respective military forces must be postured to respond in a timely and effective way to the range of contingencies that may arise in our region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

If asked: What activities will the US marines in Darwin undertake?

Over a six month period, these Marines are expected to undertake bilateral training in Australia with the Australian Defence Force, unilateral training in Australia, and engage with countries in the region.

Since their arrival, the Marines have undertaken unilateral field training activities at Kangaroo Flats Training Area, involving practicing tactics, techniques, and procedures for platoon-level manoeuvre, and small arms and machine gun live fire training.

The Marines have also worked to establish and strengthen relationships with the Darwin community and have participated in:

- various ANZAC Day activities, including marching in the Darwin parade, attending the Palmerston ceremonies and laying wreaths at three different events;
- a barbeque with the Australian-American Association at the Defence Museum;
- a 5k run with the Darwin Runners Club; and
- a sports day with Clontarf Foundation (a not-for-profit organisation that supports young Aboriginal men).

The Marines have had leave in the Darwin region on each weekend since their arrival, and I expect the Marines will continue to receive regular leave.

If asked: What legal arrangements are in place for this initiative?

US personnel in Australia are in Australian territory pursuant to the terms of the *Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the*

United States of America concerning the Status of United States Forces in Australia, and Protocol, which entered into force on 9 May 1963 (Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA).

The SOFA is applied in Australian domestic law by the Defence (Visiting Forces) Act 1963 (DVFA).

The SOFA grants Australia exclusive jurisdiction for alleged offences against Australian laws but not US law; and exclusive jurisdiction to US military authorities for alleged offences against US law but not Australian law. Where the alleged offence is a crime against both Australian and US law then there is concurrent jurisdiction.

The Status of Forces Agreement provides that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the US shall have primary right to exercise jurisdiction over persons subject to US military law where:

- the offence is solely against the property or security of the US;
- the offence is solely against the person or property of a member of the US forces, the civilian component or a dependant; or
- the offence arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

The Commonwealth Attorney-General determines whether US military personnel were acting in the course of official duties at the time of the alleged offence.

The SOFA has adequately provided the legal arrangements for the deployment of US visiting forces since that time, and applies to US Marine Corps personnel in northern Australia.

The Government will monitor these arrangements to ensure they remain adequate.

If asked: What impact these initiatives have on the local community?

The long-standing nature of US engagement with Australia has provided both security and economic benefits to Australia and Australian business.

It will of course be important to ensure that affected communities can manage, and potentially benefit from, any increase in visits and this forms part of our planning.

The Government is conducting assessments of the social and economic impacts of increased defence interaction with the US.

- Defence is coordinating this work and will report the results of these assessments to me (the Minister for Defence) in due course.

If asked: about continuing discussions with the United States about future joint force posture initiatives?

Further opportunities may emerge over the longer term for cooperation with countries in the Indian Ocean littoral on activities such as humanitarian and disaster-relief and counter-piracy.

Future discussions will consider Australia's Indian Ocean posture and the implications of developments in that strategically important region.

This may include the possible role of facilities such as Cocos Islands and Western Australia's HMAS Stirling in Australia's defence planning.

The Progress Report of the ADF Posture Review identified that the Cocos Islands have significant military and strategic value.

Any proposal regarding possible future options for increased use of the Cocos Islands, including potential US use, is a long term prospect and no decisions have been made.

The US does not have permanent military bases on Australian territory and this will not change.

Any future activities will take place in Australian facilities.

If asked: about US Air Force visits

Australia has hosted US strategic bombers since the early 1940s.

A detachment of US B-52s spent a significant period of time in Darwin in the 1980s and US aircraft have visited Australia frequently since that time.

A Statement of Principles on US Strategic Bomber Training in Australia was signed in 2005 and governs US bomber activities in Australia.

These activities contribute significantly to ADF training and exercises.

Importantly the activities comply with Australian environmental rules, and only munitions approved for use on the relevant ranges can be released.

US B52s have made regular training and exercise sorties to Australia under the program.

Australia has also hosted US Air Force Global Hawk aircraft on multiple occasions.

The Global Hawk first deployed to Australia for a six week period in 2001.

While discussions are at an early stage, Australian and American officials are looking at the possibility of increased US air access to Australian airfields across Northern Australia, including RAAF Tindal and the bare bases at Learmonth and Scherger.

If asked: Is the enhanced cooperation about Australia and the US working to contain China?

No - These initiatives are about improving cooperation between Australia, the US, and other countries in the region.

They are not directed at China or at any other country.

Australia sees a strong and adaptable US presence in the Asia-Pacific, and a strong alliance relationship, as the best way to guarantee continuing peace and security in the region.

This peace and stability is crucial to the continued prosperity of the region, from which all countries, including China, benefit.

We maintain positive and separate relationships with both the United States and China.

Strengthening our relations with one of these countries does not detract from our relationship with the other.

If asked: What is your reaction to the announcement by the United States and Japan that Marines will be relocated from Japan to other locations including Guam?

We welcome the agreement by the United States and Japan on base realignment and relocation of US Marines to Guam.

This is significant agreement and a positive development that supports the United States' rebalance toward the Asia Pacific.

Australia is a strong supporter of the United States-Japan alliance, which plays a key role in underpinning stability and security within the region.

The United States-Japan agreement, along with our own force posture initiatives with the United States, will help contribute to regional security and stability.

If asked: Will the United States Marine Corps deployments to Australia come from Japan?

The rotational Marine deployments will come to Australia from United States' bases in the Asia Pacific and bases in the continental United States.

The first rotation of Marines, which arrived in the Northern Territory earlier this month, comes from the 2nd battalion, 3rd Marines, which is based in Hawaii.

The United States has advised that we can expect future Marine rotations to be globally sourced – that is they would come from a number of locations, including the United States and Japan.

The source of the Marine deployments to Australia is a matter for United States planning.

If asked: Is Australia taking the United States Marines that Japan rejected?

The premise of the question is that the US presence in the Asia Pacific region is not welcome.

This is clearly not the case.

The Alliance with the United States is a strategic anchor for American engagement in the Asia-Pacific, and has underpinned security, stability and prosperity in our region for over 60 years.

The rotational Marine deployments will support regional security and provide both Australia and the United States with opportunities for combined training, deepening interoperability, and enabling both countries to work together even more effectively to pursue common interests.

This initiative is an extension of our existing defence cooperation and defence arrangements. As you know, we already have exercises in place involving large numbers of US military personnel.

The rotational Marine deployments will come to Australia from United States' bases in the Asia Pacific and bases in the continental United States.

Regardless of their point of origin, these Marines will not be permanently based in Australia.

They will spend several months at a time here for rotations involving exercising and training with the Australian Defence Force, prior to departing for bilateral exercising and training with other regional partners.

It is not a valid argument to directly compare future US deployments to Darwin with the US presence in other countries, such as Okinawa in Japan.

Defence's experience in working with US forces in Australia is overwhelmingly positive.

If asked: Is Australia considering hosting US nuclear weapons?

No—the US has not asked Australia to host nuclear weapons.

If asked: Does Australia host US ships or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons?

Visits to Australian ports and airfields by US ships and aircraft have been an important part of our bilateral relationship for many years.

It is US policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any location.

US officials have, however, advised that it is not US practice to carry nuclear weapons on training flights, and US Administrations have previously said publicly that in normal circumstances US naval aircraft and ships no longer carry nuclear weapons.

If asked: Why does the US retain nuclear weapons?

The United States continues to rely on its nuclear deterrence capability to underpin US strategic power, deter attack or coercion by other nuclear powers, and sustain allied confidence in US security commitments by way of extended deterrence.

Our alliance with the United States means that, for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia.

Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance.

That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.

The US has said that it will work to reduce the role and numbers of US nuclear weapons while enhancing security for the US, its allies and partners.

Background

On 16 November 2011 Prime Minister Gillard and President Obama announced initiatives to deepen bilateral defence cooperation under the US Global Force Posture Review. Details of the initiatives were announced in a statement released by the Prime Minister on 16 November. That statement is copied below:

“Today, Prime Minister Gillard and President Obama announced two new force posture initiatives that will significantly enhance defence cooperation between Australia and the United States.

Coming on the 60th anniversary of the ANZUS Alliance, these initiatives strengthen an already robust partnership that has been an anchor of stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. They reflect our enduring and visible commitment to strengthening regional security and will increase interoperability between Australian and U.S. forces.

[In 2012], Australia will welcome the deployment of U.S. Marines to Darwin and Northern Australia, for around six months at a time, where they will conduct exercises and training on a rotational basis with the Australian Defence Force. The initial deployment will consist of a small liaison element and a company of 200 U.S. Marines. The intent in the coming years is to establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500 person Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The U.S. Marines will exercise and train on a rotational basis with the Australian Defence Force in the Northern Territory.

The leaders also agreed to closer cooperation between the RAAF and the U.S. Air Force that will result in increased rotations of U.S. aircraft through northern Australia. This will enhance bilateral collaboration and offer greater opportunities for combined training and exercises. Select equipment and supplies in support of these initiatives will be prepositioned in these locations to facilitate exercises and training.

These joint initiatives, which will take place in Australian facilities, are part of an ongoing review of U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region intended to pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable military presence in this region. They will further enhance the capabilities of both partners by increasing opportunities for combined training, deepening interoperability, and enabling both countries to work together even more effectively to pursue common interests. Moreover, these initiatives will better position both nations to join with other partners to respond in a timely and effective manner to a range of contingencies in the Asia-Pacific, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Both leaders reaffirmed that the ANZUS Alliance is one based on the strongest of friendships resulting from shared values. They agreed to continuously explore ways to deepen cooperation and to maintain the vitality of the Alliance in the face of an ever-changing global environment.”

On 26 April the United States and Japan released a joint statement announcing an adjustment of the 2006 'Realignment Roadmap' covering the relocation of United States Marines and associated air elements on and from Okinawa. The focus of the joint United States-Japan statement was the relocation of around 9,000 Marines from Okinawa to locations outside Japan, including Guam and Hawaii.

The statement also referred to the establishment of a 'rotational presence' of United States Marines in Australia, as a component of adjustments to United States Marine Corps presence in the Asia Pacific that are collectively intended to contribute to regional peace and stability, by establishing a geographically distributed force posture.

United States officials have reiterated that the Marines that are intended to deploy to Australia will be 'globally sourced' from a range of locations, including the continental United States, Hawaii, Afghanistan and Japan.

Point of Contact

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Information valid as at: 1400, 11 May 2012


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
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
Email Advice to Minister for Defence Science & Personnel


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MA12-004260







13.1.1 NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT

United States (US) Alliance


- Forged through two world wars, the Australia-US Alliance has underpinned security, stability and prosperity in our region for over 60 years and is the foundation of Australia's security arrangements.
- As economic and strategic weight shifts to the Asia-Pacific, our Alliance with the US will only increase in importance for Australia's security and for the region's stability and prosperity.


Nuclear deterrence

- The fundamental role of US nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the US and its allies and partners.
- Our Alliance with the US means that, for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the US to deter nuclear attack on Australia.
- Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US Alliance.
- At the same time Australia has consistently called for deeper and irreversible reductions in the number of nuclear weapons held by all nuclear-armed states and the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies.
- In this regard Australia welcomed the United States' Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2010 as a very substantial step by the US towards meeting its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while maintaining an effective deterrent both for the US and for its allies, including Australia.

Ship and aircraft visits

- Visits to Australian ports and airfields by US ships and aircraft have been an important part of our bilateral relationship for many years.
 - It is US policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any location.
 - US officials have, however, advised that it is not US practice to carry nuclear weapons on training flights, and US Administrations have previously said publicly that in normal circumstances US naval aircraft and ships no longer carry nuclear weapons.
- 





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Date: 17 September 2012
Date: 18 September 2012

Pine Gap's Role in Nuclear War

Talking Points

Australia is one of the most physically secure countries in the world.

Australian defence policy acknowledges the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US Alliance.

Successive Australian Governments have acknowledged that joint facilities, such as Pine Gap, could be targeted in conflict.

However, Australia's hosting of these facilities contributes to a stable system of global nuclear deterrence.

The Government does not intend to speculate on hypothetical scenarios but will continue to regularly consider its judgements concerning Australia's security, including the risk of nuclear attack.

Background

Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap has two principle roles – the collection of intelligence by technical means; and the provision of ballistic missile early warning information. The intelligence collected at Pine Gap meets critical requirements of both the US and Australia, providing information on priority intelligence targets such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and military and weapons developments. It also contributes to the monitoring of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, and provides communications support.

On Friday 26 April 2013, the *Central Australian* (a local Alice Springs newspaper) reported on whether Alice Springs could be destroyed in the crossfire if a nuclear war is declared between the US and North Korea. According to the newspaper's sources, "the only way Pine Gap can be a bona fide military target would be through a nuclear attack, which is a pretty fearsome prospect." A source also indicated North Korea doesn't have the capability to hit targets in Australia yet.

A journalist from the *Centralian Advocate* contacted Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap (JDJPG) prior to the article's release. He was advised that a Defence public statement about the facility was available and that site could provide further context. The journalist provided no context on the nature of the article and made no further contact. Of note, the article incorrectly states, "when the *Centralian Advocate* contacted Pine Gap to get a definition of what duties they perform, we were told to get it off the internet."

Point of Contact

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Information valid as at: 26 April 2013

**FOI 421/12/13
Serial 5**

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Smith/MA13-700386

Reference: DEPSEC(S)/OU1/2013/021



Australian Government
Department of Defence

MINISTERIAL SUBMISSION

Routine

Date Dept Approved:	Date Rec in Office:	Date Due:
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For Action: Minister for Defence

For Info: Mr Snowdon / Dr Kelly / Senator Feeny

Copies to: Secretary, CDF, COO, VCDF, CN, CA, CAF, CFO, CJOPS, CCDG, DEPSEC DSRG, CEO DMO, DEPSEC I&S, DEPSEC DPG, CDS, FASSP, IUCC, FASMECC, FASRA, DDIO

Subject: 2013 Defence White Paper Public Submissions Process

Purpose:

To advise you of the themes presented through the 2013 Defence White Paper public submissions, and their relativity to the draft White Paper.

Key Points:

1. s22(1)(a)(ii)

2.

3.

4.

5.

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Australia's Strategic Environment and Responses

6. §22(1)(a)(ii)

7.

8. Around 25% of submissions (broad grouping of peace and nuclear disarmament groups, individuals supporting these aims, and the Australian Greens) conveyed elements of the following set of recommendations and views relevant to Australia's strategic directions for Defence and to the Force Structure and Capability Priorities, Force Posture, and Defence Funding Sections below:

§22(1)(a)(ii)

- c) Australia should reject nuclear deterrence as a component of Australia's defence policy as this lends legitimacy to the existence of nuclear weapons and impedes urgent action needed to eliminate them, and focus effort on creating a nuclear-free world;


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
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
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
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


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

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
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
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Approved By  Brendan Sargeant Deputy Secretary Strategy 26 March 2013	
Contact Officer: Michael Shoebridge, First Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy	Phone: 
Primary Addressee <p style="text-align: right;">Stephen Smith / /</p>	
Information Addressee <p style="text-align: center;">Noted / Please Discuss</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Warren Snowdon Mike Kelly David Feeney / / / / / /</p>	

Resources:


35. 

Consultation

36. 

37. **Financial/Workplace Implications – Nil.**

Attachments:

- A. 
- B. 

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Australian Government
Department of Defence

MINISTERIAL SUBMISSION

Routine

Date Dept Approved:

Date Rec in Office:

Date Due:

For Action: Minister for Defence

Copies to: Secretary, CDF

Subject: US Nuclear Deterrence Policy **S33(a)(iii)** **Update**

Purpose:

To provide an update on US nuclear deterrence policy

Key Points:

S33(a)(iii)

Background

3. President Obama articulated US nuclear weapons policy in Prague in April 2009. The key messages included an intention to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the US' national security strategy and the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist.
4. In April 2010, the Obama administration released the United States' Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The objectives of the 2010 NPR include:
 - preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
 - reducing the role and saliency of nuclear weapons;
 - maintaining effective strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels;
 - strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of US allies and partners; and
 - sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons remain.

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[REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

New START Treaty

7. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the US and the Russian Federation entered into force in February 2010. The treaty calls for the two parties to meet the specified limits on strategic arms by February 2018, with each party having the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits set in the treaty. The parties are to be limited to 1550 warheads; a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; and a separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
8. The treaty does not constrain US programs or plans for missile defence or conventional systems, and it continues to be US policy that the US will not accept legal limitations on its ballistic missile defence capabilities.

US Nuclear Planning


9. US nuclear planning during the Cold War era was predicated almost entirely on a single large adversary (the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites) and on large-scale global exchanges. The details of the tightly-orchestrated plans (known as the single integrated operational plan, or SIOP) did not change significantly from year to year.

[REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED]

11. The 2010 NPR also articulated US 'negative security assurances' by declaring the US will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to and in

compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the case of countries not covered by this assurance (those states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations), there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which the US reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to deter a conventional or biological attack against the US or its allies and partners.

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13. While emphasizing that nuclear weapons are a key component of US security assurances to its allies and partners, the 2010 NPR also acknowledges the role of conventional forces, ballistic missile defences and a conventional global strike capability in deterring nuclear attack or coercion on US allies and partners.


Extended Deterrence


14. In October 2010, the US and the Republic of Korea established the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence. The Committee meets biannually to discuss deterrence requirements and mechanisms, and to share relevant information and policy perspectives. **S33(a)(iii)**


The US conducts similar arrangements with Japan through biannual Extended Deterrence Dialogues, established in 2011.

15. NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of May 2012 states that nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence, and that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence in order to fulfil its commitments.

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16. **S33(a)(iii)**



17. **S33(a)(iii)**


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18. S.33 (a) (1) (D)



Recommendation:

That you note this update on US nuclear deterrence policy

Noted / Please Discuss



Approved By

Brendan Sargeant

Brendan Sargeant
Deputy Secretary Strategy
9 April 2013

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Facilities and Technical Programs

Phone: 02 6265 5141

Primary Addressee

Stephen Smith
/ /

Resources:

19. N/A.

Consultation:

20. N/A.


Financial/Workplace Implications:

21. N/A.


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
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
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
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






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
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






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
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








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