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Australian Government
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**MEDIA TALKING POINTS
DISTRIBUTION:
STANDARD**

Topic: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Originating Division: ISD

Subject: UN negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty

Version Date: 16/2/2017

Reason for Update: Australia's position on participation in UN negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty

Version: 10

Expiry: 31/03/2017

Talking Points

- Australia will not participate in the forthcoming UN Conference to negotiate a treaty to ban nuclear weapons – or in the related organisational meeting on 16 February in New York. This approach is consistent with our clear and longstanding position on the proposed nuclear weapons ban treaty.
- Australia voted against the UNGA71 resolution calling for negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty. We were among 83 countries which did not vote in favour of that resolution, and among 38 countries to vote against it.
- The proposed ban treaty would not advance nuclear disarmament:
 - it would be ineffective in eliminating – or even reducing – nuclear weapon arsenals
 - it would not enhance security
 - it would have no effective verification measures to ensure compliance
 - it risks undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by creating ambiguity and confusion through parallel obligations, and by deepening divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.
- Australia shares with the international community the goal of a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons. This is not a quick or easy task - it will take sustained, practical and incremental steps of the kind Australia actively supports. This includes work towards a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and further sustained work on nuclear disarmament verification.

- Many countries share our commitment to effective nuclear disarmament which addresses security concerns and engages states possessing nuclear weapons. We will continue to work with those countries and others towards our nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
- So long as the threat of nuclear attack exists, US extended nuclear deterrence will serve Australia's fundamental national security interests. We must be realistic about the environment in which we operate – DPRK provocations and nuclear tests are a case in point.
- We are aware of the joint International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) – Austrian Embassy briefing on the ban treaty held on 15 February in Canberra.

Any use or disclosure of personal information about individuals and the incidents contained in this background should not be made public. To do so may constitute a breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

Background

Australia's long-standing opposition to a nuclear weapons ban treaty is based on an assessment that Australia's interests in effective disarmament and non-proliferation are best served through supporting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We consider that a simple ban treaty negotiated without nuclear weapons states would not facilitate the reduction in nuclear weapons but will instead increase the polarisation between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, thereby reducing prospects for disarmament. We see no value in ban treaty negotiations that are disconnected from the current security environment. We work with like-minded countries to advocate for a practical "building blocks" approach to disarmament which includes as priorities the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, transparency and confidence-building.

The UNGA71 ban treaty resolution contains a decision "to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination." The resolution further provides for negotiations to take place in New York on 27-31 March 2017 and from 15 June to 7 July 2017, with a one-day organisational meeting to occur as soon as possible (now set for 16 February in New York). Australia will be in good company in not participating in negotiations.

s 33(a)(iii)

Austrian Ambassador Dr Bernhard Zimburg and ICAN Australia Vice-President Dr Sue Wareham OAM co-hosted on 15 February "a briefing on the state of play of the UN mandate to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty followed by a reception", with particular reference to the UNGA71 ban treaty resolution and forthcoming ban treaty negotiations (at 1 pm at the Austrian Residence, Canberra).

The ban treaty resolution was adopted by the full UN General Assembly on 23 December 2016: 110 voted for, 38 voted against, 13 abstained and 32 failed to enter a vote. (On 27 October 2016, the UNGA71 First Committee had voted in support of this resolution to start negotiations in 2017 on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. In the First Committee, 123 countries voted in support of the resolution, 38 opposed and 16 abstained, while 16 countries failed to enter a vote.) Australia voted against the resolution both in the First Committee and in the full General Assembly vote. So too did Japan, Germany, Canada and the P3 (US, UK and France). China, India and Pakistan abstained on both occasions. The DPRK voted in support of the resolution in First Committee, but failed to enter a vote in the full General Assembly vote.

The UNGA71 ban treaty resolution came out of the final report of the Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament, which was adopted on 19 August 2016. Australia voted against that report precisely because it contained what amounted to a recommendation that the General Assembly convene a conference in 2017 to negotiate a "legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons". Australia's action in

calling for a vote on the final OEWG report in August 2016 drew criticism from civil society. The voting results at First Committee and the UNGA Plenary are being portrayed as a success by countries and civil society which support a ban treaty. However, the issue is deeply divisive. By way of comparison, the UNGA First Committee resolution which Australia supported on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was adopted by the full UN General Assembly with 159 votes in support.

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Handling Notes

Media Interest

NGOs such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN Australia) are critical of Australia's ban treaty position. A spike in media interest may arise from the 16 February (17 February AEDT) organisational session in New York and the 15 February ICAN-Austrian Embassy function in Canberra.



Australian Government
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**MEDIA TALKING
POINTS
DISTRIBUTION:
STANDARD**

Topic: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY **Originating Division: ISD**
Subject: Australia's position on a nuclear weapons ban treaty and role in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Nuclear Disarmament

Version Date: 25/10/2016

Reason for Update: upcoming UNGA vote on nuclear weapons ban treaty resolution

Version: 5.21

Expiry: 19/11/2016

Talking Points

How will Australia vote on the UNGA71 First Committee resolution on a nuclear weapons ban treaty?

- *Australia will vote against the UNGA71 First Committee resolution calling for negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty*
 - *our position on a nuclear weapons ban treaty has been consistent and clear.*
- *A nuclear weapons ban treaty that*
 - *does not include the states which possess nuclear weapons; and*
 - *is disconnected from the security environment,*
 - *would be counterproductive and not lead to reductions in nuclear arsenals.*
- *Such a treaty risks damaging the NPT*
 - *for example by creating parallel obligations and thus ambiguity and confusion*
 - *and it would deepen divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.*
- *There would be no effective verification measures to ensure compliance.*
- *Australia shares with the international community the goal of a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons*
 - *this is not a quick or easy task - it will take sustained, practical and incremental steps.*

Will Australia be participating in a UN conference negotiating a nuclear weapons ban treaty in 2017?

- *Australia is considering its position and will decide on the basis of our national interests.*

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Does the Government oppose a 'nuclear weapons ban treaty' because of Australia's reliance on extended nuclear deterrence?

- Australia opposes a ban treaty because it would be ineffective in eliminating nuclear weapons, would not enhance security and risks undermining the NPT.
- So long as the threat of nuclear attack exists, US extended nuclear deterrence will serve Australia's fundamental national security interests
 - we must be realistic about the environment in which we operate.

If asked: Is Australia isolating itself in the region and the world on this issue?

- No, a wide range of countries, including from Europe, North Asia and North America expressed their disagreement with the report at the final session
 - 22 countries including Australia opposed the report and 13 countries abstained.
- Many countries share Australia's commitment to effective nuclear disarmament which addresses security concerns and engages the States that possess nuclear weapons.

Any use or disclosure of personal information about individuals and the incidents contained in this background should not be made public. To do so may constitute a breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

Background

Voting on the UNGA71 First Committee resolution on a nuclear weapons ban treaty will take place between 26 October to 2 November 2016 in New York. Australia will vote against the resolution. The resolution includes a decision by the General Assembly to convene a UN conference to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons from 27 to 31 March 2017 and from 15 June to 7 July 2017 in New York. As of 21 October, the resolution had 48 co-sponsors.

On 20 October, The Guardian reported that Australia would not support the ban treaty resolution and was growing "increasingly isolated from a global disarmament push". On the same day, SBS and Nine News reported DFAT officials had confirmed at Senate estimates hearings that Australia would not support a UN resolution on a ban treaty. Also on 20 October, Lowy Interpreter published an article "Australia digs itself deeper into nuclear disarmament policy hole" arguing Australia's stance against a ban treaty was based on its reliance on extended nuclear deterrence.

s 22(1)(a)(iii)

Topic: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Originating Division: ISD

Subject: Australia's position on a nuclear weapons ban treaty and role in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Nuclear Disarmament

Version Date: 28/10/2016

Reason for Update: UNGA71: voting on nuclear weapons ban treaty resolution has taken place

Version: 6

Expiry: 19/11/2016

Talking Points

Why did Australia vote against the UNGA71 First Committee resolution on a nuclear weapons ban treaty?

- *Thirty-eight countries, including Australia, voted against the UNGA71 First Committee resolution calling for negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty*
 - *our position on a nuclear weapons ban treaty has been consistent and clear.*
- *A nuclear weapons ban treaty that*
 - *does not include the states which possess nuclear weapons; and*
 - *is disconnected from the security environment,*
 - *would be counterproductive and not lead to reductions in nuclear arsenals.*
- *Such a treaty risks damaging the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*
 - *for example by creating parallel obligations and thus ambiguity and confusion*
 - *and it would deepen divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.*
- *There would be no effective verification measures to ensure compliance.*
- *Australia shares with the international community the goal of a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons*
 - *this is not a quick or easy task - it will take sustained, practical and incremental steps.*

Will Australia participate in a UN conference negotiating a nuclear weapons ban treaty (commencing March 2017)?

- *No decision has been made at this stage, though Australia's views on the merits of the proposed treaty are well known.*

Does the Government oppose a 'nuclear weapons ban treaty' because of Australia's reliance on extended nuclear deterrence?

- *Australia opposes a ban treaty because it would be ineffective in eliminating nuclear weapons, would not enhance security and risks undermining the NPT.*
- *So long as the threat of nuclear attack exists, US extended nuclear deterrence will serve Australia's fundamental national security interests*
 - *we must be realistic about the environment in which we operate.*

If asked: Is Australia isolating itself in the region and the world on this issue?

- *No, 38 countries voted against the UNGA71 First Committee resolution on a nuclear weapons ban treaty*
 - *and 16 countries abstained.*
- *Many countries share Australia's commitment to effective nuclear disarmament which addresses security concerns and engages the States that possess nuclear weapons.*

Any use or disclosure of personal information about individuals and the incidents contained in this background should not be made public. To do so may constitute a breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

Background

The UNGA71 First Committee voted in support of the resolution to start negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons in 2017 on 27 October New York time. 123 countries voted in support of the resolution, 38 opposed and 16 abstained. Australia voted against the resolution. Japan, Germany, Canada voted against, as did the P3 (US, UK and France). DPRK voted in support. China, India and Pakistan abstained. Voting in First Committee requires a simple majority. The next step is for the General Assembly to adopt the resolution (usually in early December), when a two-thirds majority will be required, at which point the outcome will be formalised.

The resolution is expected to pass in December and the voting result is being portrayed as a success by countries and civil society which support a ban treaty. The issue is deeply divisive. By way of comparison, other UNGA First Committee resolutions which Australia supported on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty were passed with 177 votes in support. The resolution provides for negotiations to take place in New York in March and July 2017 with an organisational meeting to take place as soon as possible.

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The countries which voted against the UNGA71 resolution on a ban treaty are:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

The countries which abstained on the UNGA71 resolution on a ban treaty are:

Armenia, Belarus, China, Finland, Guyana, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sudan, Switzerland, Uzbekistan and Vanuatu.

The countries which voted in favour of the UNGA71 resolution on a ban treaty are (countries in our region have been bolded):

*Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, **Bangladesh**, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, **Brunei Darussalam**, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, **Cambodia**, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, **DPRK**, Dem Rep Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equitorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, **Fiji**, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, **Indonesia**, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, **Kiribati**, Kuwait, Lao, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malwai, **Malaysia**, Maldives, Malta, **Marshall Islands**, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, **Myanmar**, Namibia, **Nauru**, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, **Palau**, Panama, **PNG**, Paraguay, Peru, **Philippines**, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, **Samoa**, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, **Singapore**, **Solomon Islands**, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, **Timor-Leste**, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, UAE, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.*

On 10 October, Greens Senator and Deputy Leader Scott Ludlam issued a media statement criticising the Australian Government for refusing to allow its Senate motion in support of a ban treaty. s 22(1)(a)(ii)

pp. 9-28 exempt in full - s
47C, 47E(d)

REDACTED

GU32825H

Title: UN: Disarmament: OEWG: US/UK views
MRN: GU32825H 27/06/2016 07:06:58 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachment omitted as outside scope of request

Response: Routine, Requires Action

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ***
[REDACTED] ***

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32825H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32825H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Comment

s 33(a)(ii)

GU32825H

s 33(a)(iii)

Given caretaker requirements, this could be done after consultation with the incoming government, but time-lines are tight.

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32826H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: BLM meeting with Chair of OEWG
MRN: GU32826H 28/06/2016 09:00:14 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: GE15/808
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachment omitted as outside scope of the request

Response: Routine, Information Only

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

We (s 33(a)(iii) Australian Dep PR s 33(a)(iii)) called on Ambassador Thani Thongpakhdi, Chair of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG), on 27 June s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32826H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32826H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Comment

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32826H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32856H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: BLM meeting with Chair of OEWG
MRN: GU32856H 12/07/2016 04:27:52 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: GE15/808
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachments omitted as outside scope of request

Response: Routine, Requires Action

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~~CONFIDENTIAL AUSTEO~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 33(a)(iii) invited HOM, s 33(a)(iii)
to meet on 5 July s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32856H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32856H

Meeting with OEWG Chair Thongphakdi

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32856H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Other developments

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Comment

s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

WH69701H

Title: United States: Nuclear disarmament - senior State and NSC views
MRN: WH69701H 14/07/2016 11:27:16 AM EDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Washington

From File:

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachment omitted as outside scope of request

Response: Routine, Information Only

~~SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

*** ~~THE FOLLOWING CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~ ***

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

On 4–8 July, FAS ISD (Sadleir), accompanied by AS ACB (Hardy) called on a range of senior State Department and National Security Council (NSC) officials to discuss the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on disarmament (reftel).s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

WH69701H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

WH69701H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

WH69701H

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

CE141317H

Title: Nuclear Disarmament - Japan's position
MRN: CE141317H 22/07/2016 05:44:56 PM ZE10
To: Tokyo
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Canberra (CHCH/DFAT/SRD/ARB)
From File:
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Response: Routine, Requires Action

Summary

Grateful Tokyo seek a read-out from MFA on Japan's policy approach to the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament in Geneva which will resume for its final session in mid-August. We would also welcome your analysis of the dynamics of Japan's policy approach on disarmament.

Grateful Tokyo seek a read-out from MFA on Japan's policy approach to the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament in Geneva which will resume for its final session in mid-August (refuels refer). We are also interested in your analysis of the dynamics of Japan's policy approach on this issue.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

CE141317H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 33(a)(iii)

5. Cable prepared in consultation with NAD.

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32864H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: discussion with Japan's Geneva mission on
OEWG
MRN: GU32864H 22/07/2016 12:55:11 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN

From File: GE15/808

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Information Only

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

We (Dep PR) met with Deputy PR, Japanese Mission in Geneva, s 33(a)(iii) and s 33(a)(iii)
First Secretary, on 20 July, s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32864H

s 33(a)(iii)

GU32864H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

CE141433H

Title: Nuclear Disarmament - German and Dutch Positions
MRN: CE141433H 28/07/2016 06:20:54 PM ZE10
To: Berlin; The Hague
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Canberra (CHCH/DFAT/SRD/ARB)
From File:
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Requires Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

Grateful Berlin and The Hague seek a read-out from German and Dutch foreign ministries on their respective policy approaches to the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Disarmament in Geneva which will resume for its final session in mid-August. We would also welcome your analysis of the dynamics of their policy approaches on disarmament.

Grateful Berlin and The Hague seek read-outs from German and Dutch foreign ministries on their respective policy approaches to the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament in Geneva, which will resume for its final session in mid-August (reftels refer). We are also interested in your analysis of the dynamics of their policy approaches on this issue.

s 33(a)(iii)

CE141433H

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 33(a)(iii)

CE141433H

s 33(a)(iii)

7. **Cable prepared in consultation with WES.**

text ends
s 22(1)(a)(ii)

TK17011H

Title: Nuclear Disarmament - Japan's position
MRN: TK17011H 29/07/2016 11:47:33 AM ZE9
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Tokyo
From File:
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Requires Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b).

Post (s 22(1)(a)(ii)) met MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Division Director, s 33(a)(iii)
on 27 July to discuss Japan's position on the UN Open-Ended Working Group
(OEWG) on Disarmament.

s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

TK17011H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

TK17011H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Comment

s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32871H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: OEWG : Zero Draft
MRN: GU32871H 29/07/2016 04:15:46 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN

From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachment omitted as outside scope of the request

Response: Routine, Requires Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii)

As foreshadowed, the zero draft authored by the Chair of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", Thai Ambassador Thani Thongpakhdi, has been issued (see attached), and delegations have until 5 August to formulate their initial responses. s 33(a)(iii)

GU32871H

s 33(a)(iii)

for a Conference on numerous occasions).

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

(ICAN and other NGOs articulated the need

Other issues

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32871H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32871H

s 33(a)(iii)

Conclusion

s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

CE141519H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: Australia's approach to the Open-Ended Working Group
MRN: CE141519H 02/08/2016 07:06:15 PM ZE10
To: Geneva UN
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Canberra (CHCH/DFAT/SRD/ARB)
From File:
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Information Only

Summary

We provide guidance for posts in pursuing our interests in the final session of the OEWG in Geneva in August, s 33(a)(iii)

We appreciate Geneva UN's reporting on developments in the lead-up to the final session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament in Geneva from 5 to 9 and 16 to 19 August. In considering Australia's approach, we also value the views of key partners including s 33(a)(iii) and appreciate posts' efforts in engaging counterparts in capitals and on the ground in Geneva.

2. This cable provides the strategic framework for post (Geneva UN) in pursuing our interests in the final OEWG sessions, in close consultation with us. It will be necessary for Geneva to have tactical flexibility on the ground s 33(a)(iii)

3. s 33(a)(iii)

CE141519H

s 33(a)(iii)

4. Thanks GU32871H reporting initial views on the zero-draft of the OEWG report which was released on 28 July ahead of consultations on 5 August. We are considering the draft report carefully and will provide initial views to posts s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

CE141519H

s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

pp 63-65 exempt in full -
s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

REDACTED

WH69759H

Title: United States: Nuclear Disarmament: Open-Ended Working Group s 22(1)(a)(ii)

MRN: WH69759H 04/08/2016 05:47:23 PM EDT

To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Washington

From File:

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Information Only

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

As per reftels, on 2 August we called on State's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance s 33(a)(iii) to discuss the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and other disarmament issues. s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b) during FAS ISD's recent visit (WH69701H), we updated s 22(1)(a)(ii) on Australia's approach to the s 33(a)(iii)

OEWG

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

WH69759H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

WH69759H

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

BE11922H

Title: Nuclear Disarmament: German views on OEWG draft report
MRN: BE11922H 05/08/2016 06:50:45 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Berlin
From File:
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachment omitted as outside scope of request

Response: Routine, Requires Action

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Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

As requested in ref tel, Post s 22(1)(a)(ii) met with the Foreign Office (s 33(a)(iii) Head of IAEA and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Unit and s 33(a)(iii) Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Unit) to discuss German perspectives on the upcoming final session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament in Geneva. s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

BE11922H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32882H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: Australia's approach to the Open-Ended Working Group : update from Geneva
MRN: GU32882H 12/08/2016 06:22:52 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
EDRMS
Files: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
References:

Response: Routine, Requires Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

The Chair's revised outcomes document of the OEWG on multilateral nuclear disarmament is due out on 15 August. s 33(a)(iii)

With one more week until the conclusion of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) process on "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", we (HOM and Dep PR) met the Chair of the OEWG, Thai Ambassador Thani Thongpakhdi, s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Meeting with OEWG Chair

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32882H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

The Zero Draft

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32882H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Next steps

s 33(a)(iii)

GU32882H

s 33(a)(iii)

15. We shall provide a further update on developments COB Monday 19 August, Geneva time.

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32884H

Title: UN: Nuclear Disarmament: Australia's approach to the Open-Ended Working Group : update from Geneva
MRN: GU32884H 15/08/2016 07:42:15 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachments omitted as outside scope of request

Response: Routine, Requires Action

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Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

The revised text of the outcomes document was circulated to delegations on 15 August. s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii), s33(b)

GU32884H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32884H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32887H

Title: UN Disarmament: OEWG: crunch time
MRN: GU32887H 18/08/2016 08:55:34 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Information Only

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Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

We seek instructions on the compromise text, as well as the
possibility of Australia initiating the vote, should we decide to proceed with this strategy.

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

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s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Position on voting

12. Grateful confirmation that, on the assumption the text was not significantly changed from its current form, we should vote no, rather than abstain. s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

CE141925H

Title: UN Disarmament: OEWG: instructions
MRN: CE141925H 19/08/2016 04:10:33 PM ZE10
To: Geneva UN
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Canberra (CHCH/DFAT/SRD/ARB)
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Priority, Requires Action by 19/08/2016

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Summary

The OEWG Chair's compromise text is not acceptable. s 33(a)(iii)

Thanks refels (s 22(1)(a)(ii))). We provide instructions for the final day of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Disarmament on 19 August as follows. This approach has Ministerial approval.

2. The proposed compromise text s 33(a)(iii)

3. s 33(a)(iii)

CE141925H

s 33(a)(iii)

6. s 33(a)(iii)

8. We confirm that on the assumption the text is not significantly changed from its current form s 33(a)(iii) Based on the revised draft report (received on 19/8) and the Chair's compromise text for paragraph 67 (previously 62), s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

CE141930H

Title: UN Disarmament: OEWG: instructions: responses from Japan, Germany and the Netherlands
MRN: CE141930H 19/08/2016 10:59:39 PM ZE10
To: Berlin; Geneva UN; The Hague; Tokyo
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Canberra (CHCH/DFAT/SRD/ARB)

From File:

EDRMS

Files:

References:

Response: Routine, Requires Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

CE141930H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32888H

Title: UN Nuclear Disarmament: OEWG: outcome
MRN: GU32888H 19/08/2016 10:26:38 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Response: Routine, Information Only

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Summary

Notwithstanding a final compromise attempt by the Chair on 19 August, the final draft outcome document submitted to the OEWG on nuclear disarmament s 33(a)(iii) s 33(a)(iii)

and then formally requested a vote on the text in the plenary s 33(a)(iii). The end result was 68 delegations in favour of the text, 22 against (including Australia), and 13 abstentions.

As foreshadowed, the final draft outcomes document of the OEWG on nuclear disarmament, submitted to delegations for action, s 33(a)(iii) Prohibition Treaty negotiation. This was notwithstanding a final compromise attempt by the

and then initiated a vote on the text at the plenary in the afternoon, s 33(a)(iii)

Final voting on the text was 68 in favour, 22 against, and 13 abstentions. s 33(a)(iii)

Prohibition Treaty Support

2. The outcome is a sobering wake-up call for Prohibition Treaty advocates. Final numbers in support, even with the OEWG sponsorship program in place, were 68. s 33(a)(iii)

GU32888H

s 33(a)(iii)

Civil Society

5. Australian leadership on calling for the vote was noted in the comments of several NGOs present, and negative publicity can be anticipated in the coming days.

s 33(a)(iii)

Role of the Chair, Thai Ambassador Thani Thongpakhdi

7. Ambassador Thongpakhdi was a capable and sincere Chair throughout the three sessions. His painstakingly consultative approach was commended by all in what was obviously a very difficult exercise. We (HOM and Dep PR) both underlined our sincere

GU32888H

appreciation to him, and his capital based delegation, at the end of proceedings on 19 August for their hard work.

Comment

8. We will report more fully on the OEWG process s 33(a)(iii)

9. s 33(a)(iii)

It has done nothing therefore to reduce the polarisation that exists across the disarmament architecture and arguably, has further alienated the NWS from the main disarmament discourse dominating the disarmament landscape at the present time. s 33(a)(iii)

text ends
s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32890H

Title: UN Nuclear Disarmament: OEWG: initial reactions
MRN: GU32890H 22/08/2016 06:28:28 PM CEDT
To: Geneva UN
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Requires Action

[REDACTED]

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Thanks reftel. We report the following further reactions to the OEWG outcome, and will provide more considered reflections shortly.

US/UK reaction

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32890H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32890H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32910H

Title: UN Nuclear Disarmament: OEWG: further reactions from Geneva
MRN: GU32910H 16/09/2016 06:06:51 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
EDRMS
Files:
References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Requires Action

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Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

The following draws on further assessments of the OEWG on nuclear disarmament from our P3 colleagues, other missions and ICAN. This report also covers two US-hosted meetings on the OEWG over recent weeks. We shall report separately on BLM discussions on 15 and 16 September.

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32910H

s 33(a)(ii), s 33(b)

GU32910H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32910H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32910H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32910H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

ICAN

19. We (Dep PR) have had several recent discussions with ICAN (Beatrice Finh, Executive Director). She said ICAN would have preferred a consensus outcome, and regretted that we had called for the vote. She conceded that the numbers had been stripped back by the voting process which, while not surprising her, had surprised many others in civil society. But this would not diminish ICAN's commitment to urging states to plough forward with the current timetable for negotiating a Prohibition Treaty. Looking forward to First Committee, we noted our concerns the Prohibition Treaty posed for existing disarmament architecture, in particular the NPT, and this would guide us in our response to any successor resolution to 70/33. Finh asked whether our decision to call for a vote as at the behest of the US. We said "no"; our redline had been clearly communicated to the Chair and that we formulated our policy response to the OEWG in relation to our own national interests, not those of other countries. She said that even if numbers were initially modest, ICAN believed that a Prohibition Treaty negotiation would be worth pursuing. She envisaged over one hundred delegations voting in support of the Prohibition Treaty resolution, with over 60 states being in a position to sign a negotiated Prohibition Treaty at first instance. This would meet their expectations.

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32912H

Title: UN: Disarmament: OEWG outcome: as the dust settles
MRN: GU32912H 19/09/2016 07:31:32 PM CEDT
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

The cable has the following attachment/s -
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Response: Routine, Information Only

~~CONFIDENTIAL - AUSTRALIA~~

~~*** THE FOLLOWING CONTAINS INFORMATION FOR AUSTRALIAN EYES ***~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~***

Summary

Our Geneva assessment is that we secured a reasonable OEWG outcome in difficult circumstances, s 33(a)(iii). While we negotiated hard in order to achieve a balanced outcome, a final vote was always on the cards. The BLM demonstrated its value, contributing significantly to the OEWG report, and remaining broadly united by not supporting the push for a ban treaty. s 33(a)(iii)

From a Geneva perspective, our overall assessment is that we secured a reasonable OEWG outcome in difficult circumstances. s 33(a)(iii)

We offer the following reflections as the dust settles on this challenging exercise. We are reporting separately on recent BLM consideration of the OEWG outcome, and what it might mean for UNGA First Committee and beyond, notably the next NPT Prepcom in Vienna in 2017.

Clearing the air

2. What is apparent already is that our call for our vote on 19 August is widely seen as a key inflection point. This action has cleared the air and focussed minds on some uncomfortable realities. This crunch point would have come soon anyway, in New York at UNGA in October s 33(a)(iii). Nor should it have come as a surprise, s 33(a)(iii)

GU32912H

3. From the beginning, our strategy in relation to the OEWG took account of its unfortunate genesis. We consistently made clear to the Thai Chair, Ambassador Thani Thongpakdhi, and in all plenary sessions, our pessimism about the prospects of achieving a credible consensus outcome, given fundamental differences over the proposed nuclear weapons ban treaty. We sustained this message through the final "small group" negotiating session in the morning of 19 August, s 33(a)(iii)

s 33(a)(iii)

7. The fundamental problem was that the Chair's three successive drafts were consistently skewed against us: they gave the Pro-Prohibition Treaty camp what they coveted most i.e. a reference to a Ban Treaty negotiation in the "Agreed recommendations" section. When it became clear that the Chair was unable to accede to our repeated request to remove the reference from Part V, (including two written drafting proposals), our call for a vote was the logical path to follow. We sought to do this swiftly and in a way that maintained the generally constructive atmosphere among member states participating in the OEWG.

The Ban treaty bandwagon

8. It was also inevitable that the final vote on the OEWG report would deliver majority support for the recommendation to begin ban treaty negotiations. As expected, when we called for a vote, the Chair's attempted compromise language on the ban treaty reference in the agreed recommendations section was amended s 33(a)(iii) from the floor to make this recommendation explicit. This revised paragraph and the report as a whole were then adopted by a clear margin. s 33(a)(iii)

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GU32912H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32912H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32912H

s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

CE145099H

Title: UN nuclear weapons ban treaty negotiation: Handling of Australian non-participation decision
MRN: CE145099H 24/01/2017 04:53:19 PM ZE10
To: Geneva UN; London; NPDI; Paris EMB; UN New York; Vienna UN; Washington; Wellington
Cc:
From: Canberra (CHCH/DFAT/ISD/ACB)
From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
EDRMS
Files:
References: CE144651H
The cable has the following attachment/s -
attachment omitted as outside scope of request
Response: Routine, Requires Action by 24/01/2017

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~~*** THE FOLLOWING CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION ***~~

Summary

s 33(a)(iii)

We are sharing the decision with selected countries, with which we seek posts' assistance. s 33(a)(iii)

Thanks for ongoing reporting from posts on this issue.

2. s 33(a)(iii)

However, we would like to share it this week with key like-minded, s 33(a)(iii)

3. FAS ISD expects to convey the non-participation decision on 24–25 January s 33(a)(iii)

1. - we will convey outcomes of those discussions to relevant posts as soon as possible. Beyond those countries, we ask s 33(a)(iii)

4. The relevant UNGA71 resolution provides for a UN conference to be convened in New York on 27–31 March and 15 June - 7 July 2017 "to negotiate a legally binding instrument to

CE145099H

prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination". It further provides for a one-day organisational session in New York "as soon as possible", which UNNY has advised may be held on 16 February (tbc).s 33(a)(iii)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

s 33(a)(iii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

GU32992H

Title: UN: Disarmament: Ban Treaty Update
MRN: GU32992H 30/01/2017 03:57:29 PM CET
To: Canberra
Cc: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

From: Geneva UN

From File: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

EDRMS

Files:

References: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Response: Routine, Information Only

Summary

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

We hosted and chaired a meeting of the Broadly Like-minded Group of countries (BLM) on 27 January to discuss current disarmament issues, notably the latest state of play on preparations for negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons in New York this year. Discussions on the ban treaty have also come up recently in other contexts, including at the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament on 24 January, and at WEOG consultations on 26 January on preparations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Conference in Vienna in May. s 33(a)(iii)
represented at the BLM by its new Ambassador s 33(a)(iii) who has a strong

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

3. This message focusses on the ban treaty issue. s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Participation

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s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Chair of the Ban Treaty Negotiations

6. As reported by New York is 22(1)(a)(ii) Costa Rica has nominated its Geneva UN Ambassador Elayne White Gomez to preside over the conference to negotiate a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons. s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

Scope

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

GU32992H

s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

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s 33(a)(iii), s 33(b)

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

text ends

s 22(1)(a)(ii)

pp. 108-113 exempt in full -
s 47(C), 47E(d)

REDACTED