The Albanese Government’s record on nuclear weapons.
80 years on from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it’s time to act.

Positives:

• The Australian Labor Party recommitted to signing and ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at its National Conference in August 2023.
• The Government attended the first and second Meetings of States Parties to the TPNW as an observer, with Susan Templeman MP leading each delegation.
• The Government formally ended its opposition to the TPNW by abstaining on the TPNW resolution at the UN General Assembly in 2022-24.
• The Government voted “Yes” on the UN General Assembly resolution to set up a scientific study of the effects of nuclear war in 2024.
• The Government voted “Yes” on the UN General Assembly resolution on nuclear weapons victim assistance and environmental remediation in 2023.
• Positive sentiments expressed that underscore Australia’s “solemn recognition of the devastating consequences of nuclear war” and “redoubling [its] efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons”.
• Continued support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to which Australia is a party, and a proposed fissile material cut-off treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (but not for nuclear propulsion or other purposes).

Negatives:

• Despite Labor’s longstanding policy commitment, the Albanese Government has failed to progress signature and ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
• The Australian Government has progressed plans to acquire submarines fuelled with weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium under the AUKUS agreement, a major risk to nuclear non-proliferation and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards regime.
• Australian Defence Force plans to host six American B-52 aircraft at RAAF Tindal in the NT, with upgraded facilities and support to enable a more permanent presence. Around half of the US B-52 fleet are nuclear-capable. Unless nuclear-capable B-52s are excluded, this would, for the first time, mean that nuclear weapons could be deployed from Australia.
• Australia’s national security policy continues to claim protection by the US nuclear arsenal under the doctrine of “nuclear deterrence”, thereby supporting the threat and potential use of nuclear weapons, with command, control, targeting and increasingly, logistical assistance from facilities on Australian soil.
• Australia again abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons due to specific language, suggesting there are circumstances in which the government believes use of nuclear weapons is justified.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese MP has long been a champion of nuclear disarmament, stating “nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever created”. He is among the 110 federal parliamentarians to have committed to work for Australia to join the TPNW by signing ICAN’s Parliamentary Pledge, including three-quarters of all federal sitting Labor members.

Labor’s election in 2022 was preceded by a long period of opposition to the TPNW under Coalition governments, including a boycott of the treaty negotiations in 2017. While the Labor government has taken positive steps on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, these are modest when viewed alongside Australia’s deepening support for US nuclear war planning and nuclear-capable operations and plans to acquire submarines fuelled by weapons-grade uranium.

The next term of government should be marked by bolder action and signing the TPNW, like most of our regional neighbours. This would reassure them, Australians and the world that we have no intention of ever acquiring nuclear weapons and will end rather than deepen Australia’s assistance for their possible use.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Albanese Government has engaged constructively with the TPNW, by ending its formal opposition to it at the UN General Assembly and participating in both Meetings of States Parties thus far. The Foreign Minister has said the TPNW has “substantial normative value”.

While the Government has said it is examining the Treaty as part of its ambitious agenda on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it also continues to raise the three considerations expressed in Labor’s platform policy as obstacles to signature. These three considerations, on the need for universalisation, complementarity of the TPNW with the NPT, and a strong safeguards and verification architecture, are easily addressed. Yet they continue to be invoked to obscure the real reasons for delay, being pressure from the US not to ratify, and the perceived but over-stated complexities of the need to disavow the US “nuclear umbrella” to comply with the Treaty.

Joining the TPNW will ensure Australia does not support or facilitate the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons anywhere, ever. It would be consistent with Australia’s positive record on other inhumane and indiscriminate weapons, in which Australia has taken action independent of the US. Support for the Treaty in the Pacific and South-East Asia is almost unanimous, including two of the newest states parties, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands.

Support for the TPNW is high among the general public, civil society and parliamentarians across Australia. Signing on will be the single most effective and comprehensive measure Australia can take to further global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Without taking such action, Australia will remain complicit with the nuclear-armed minority and the perpetuation of threats of massive and indiscriminate radioactive violence.

“Extended nuclear deterrence”: Military cooperation with the US can continue without it

To comply with the TPNW, Australia must discontinue claiming protection from the US nuclear arsenal under the doctrine of “extended nuclear deterrence.” This would not prevent ongoing military cooperation and interoperability with the US on a conventional weapons-only basis. Other US allies – the Philippines, New Zealand and Thailand – have well-proven that non-nuclear military co-operation with the United States can and does continue unimpeded after they joined the TPNW.

Australia has claimed protection from US nuclear weapons since the early 90s, in a policy move that was intended to be an interim measure. Thirty years later, the concept persists in Australian defence policy, despite any nuclear weapon use in alleged defence of Australia being totally subject to the vagaries of the US President of the day.

Subscribing to “extended nuclear deterrence” means supporting the use of nuclear weapons by the US, including on Australia’s behalf, with facilities on Australian soil, notably at Pine Gap and North-West Cape, providing assistance through command, control, targeting and increasingly, logistical support. We must insist on an alliance based on conventional weapons only. This might displease the US initially but is highly unlikely to lead to the end of the ANZUS Alliance. Many Australians want Australia to enact foreign and security policies that show a greater level of independence and good global citizenship.

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons invented and cannot be used in any way that abides by international humanitarian law. A modern defence policy should have no role for the worst weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear submarines

The Albanese Government chose to endorse the Morrison Government’s controversial agreement to acquire nuclear-powered submarines as part of the AUKUS pact.

The submarines that Australia intends to purchase, and subsequently produce, utilise weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium. The acquisition of such material by a non-nuclear weapons state exploits a never-before-used section in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, making it easier and more likely other nations will follow suit. This weakens the global non-proliferation and safeguards regime by opening up the possibility of increased production, use and diversion of the fissile materials from which nuclear weapons can be made, and undermines the spirit of the NPT. Acquisition of HEU-fuelled submarines will also undermine Australia’s own efforts to reduce HEU use and stocks and achieve a fissile material cutoff treaty.

Acquiring nuclear submarines to be part of US war planning, particularly directed against China, is highly provocative and escalates tensions among nuclear-armed, and regional, states. They make war and nuclear escalation more likely. Nuclear-powered submarines would increase the priority of targets in Australia for adversaries, including nuclear-armed ones, of the US, UK and Australia.

US nuclear-capable aircraft: B-52 and B-2 bombers

There are currently no legal or policy prohibitions on nuclear weapons being brought into Australian land, airspace or waters. Around half of the US B-52 fleet are nuclear-capable and could be armed with nuclear weapons without Australia’s knowledge. The Australian Government has not sought transparency from the US, choosing to accept the US policy to neither confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its platforms. Australians have the right to know and the right to reject the presence of nuclear weapons in our airspace, land and waters, as was recognised and enacted by the government of PM Malcolm Fraser.

New activities underway at Tindal warrant review in light of Australia’s obligations under the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Raratonga). Plans to house six US B-52 aircraft at RAAF Tindal represent a major development that goes beyond mere “transit”, “rotation” or “visit” of nuclear-capable platforms. Acts falling within the definition of stationing are expressly prohibited, including “emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment”. Unless nuclear-capable B-52s are excluded, this would, for the first time, mean that nuclear weapons could directly be deployed from Australia. Basing nuclear-capable US B-52 aircraft at RAAF Tindal may breach the SPNFZ Treaty and should not proceed.

Australia hosts and is escalating visits by US B-2 long-range stealth bombers, all of which are nuclear-capable. In October 2024, Australian facilities were used to support US bombing strikes on Yemen, the first time since World War II that Australian territory has been directly used to support US strategic bomber operations.

Recommendations for the 48th Australian Parliament

• Sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons during the next term of government. This will pave the way for the negotiations to bring Australia to a position of compliance with TPNW obligations and enable ratification of the Treaty.
• Require disclosure and disallow any foreign military aircraft or vessel that is carrying nuclear weapons, or is nuclear-capable, to transit, visit, rotate through or be based in Australian territory, airspace or waters.
• Cancel the acquisition of HEU-fuelled nuclear submarines.
• There should be no direct or indirect Australian involvement or support for our allies’ nuclear operations, including through targeting, command and control, re-fuelling, maintenance and repair, overflight, accompanying flights, and Airborne Warning and Command System support. Australia’s plans and policies should support and not undermine nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Images:

1. ICAN Hiroshima Academy outside the A-bomb dome in Hiroshima, Japan, November 2024. Photo: ICAN.
2. Maxine Goodwin, June Norman, Douglas Brooks, and Karina Lester outside Parliament House during the Atomic Survivors’ Delegation in 2023, calling for Australia to abide by the provisions of the TPNW that provide assistance to victims of nuclear testing and remediation for impacted environments. Photo: Jesse Boylan.
3. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Photo: ICAN.
4. Trilateral AUKUS Summit, 2023. Photo: Getty Images.
5. Munitions on display show the full capabilities of the B-52 Stratofortress, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. Photo: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Robert J. Horstman.
6. Hon Melissa Parke, ICAN Executive Director, addressing the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, November 2023. Photo: ICAN | Darren Ornitz.
7. ICAN campaigners outside the United Nations, November 2023. Photo: ICAN | Darren Ornitz.